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The Cross-listing Decision and the Home Bias in International Equity Investments 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between the choice of the destination market for cross-
listing and the home bias of investors. We use two measures of home bias, the domestic bias (the 
degree of overinvestment in the home market), and the foreign bias (the degree of over-/under-
investment in a foreign market). First, we find a strong relationship between the domestic bias of 
investors and cross-listing decisions of firms. In particular, the level of cross-listing activity of 
firms from a particular market is negatively related to the domestic bias of the home market 
investors, while the level of cross-listing activity of firms towards a particular market is 
negatively related to the domestic bias of the host market investors. Second, we find a strong 
relationship between the foreign bias and cross-listings. In particular, the level of cross-listing 
activity from one market to another is positively related to the foreign bias in investments 
allocation of the home market investors as well as of the host market investors. Overall, these 
results suggest that corporate managers, when making a cross-listing decision, may be prone to 
the same behavioral/familiarity bias as investors. 
 
Key Words: Cross-listing, home bias, domestic bias, foreign bias, familiarity bias. 
JEL Classifications: C24; G10.  
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1. Introduction 
The incidence of cross-listings, i.e. firms listing their shares on exchanges outside their home 
market, has provoked questions about the motives for this decision. One question that is still not 
well understood is what drives the choice of market to cross-list in (Pagano et al., 2002; 
Sarkissian and Schill, 2004). Numerous theories have been proposed that provide rational 
explanations for the choice of “host” market.1 These are based on the overcoming of barriers and 
frictions, such as market segmentation and informational barriers, or a preference for “better 
quality” markets with improved investor protection, etc. Most recent research suggests that firms 
cross-list in host markets that share similarities with the home market (Sarkissian and Schill, 
2004), which has become known as the proximity preference hypothesis. However, despite a 
significant body of literature,2 there are still unanswered questions regarding cross-listing 
behavior. 
Another strand of literature that has yet to be resolved is the existence of a home bias in the 
equity allocation of investors. Numerous studies have shown that investors prefer to hold 
domestic assets over foreign assets, even though this leads to considerable under-diversification 
(see e.g. Aherne et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2005). Interestingly, many of the arguments that have 
been used to explain the cross-listing decision, have also been used to explain the home bias. In 
particular with regard to the proximity preference argument, Sarkissian and Schill (2004) note 
“that the same proximity constraints that are believed to lead to “home bias” in investment 
portfolio decisions also exert a profound influence on financing decisions” – p. (769). Although 
proximity may be one reason why investors prefer to hold foreign equity and why firms prefer to 
                                                          
1 Note that we refer to home market as the market where firms cross-list from, and host market as the market where 
firms cross-list in.  
2 see Foerster and Karolyi (1998, 1999), Errunza and Miller (2000), Doidge et al. (2004), Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(2006), Amira and Muzere (2011) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004). 
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cross-list in a specific market, there may be other factors that cause a relationship between cross-
listing decisions and home bias, for instance psychological biases. Although many studies have 
examined the determinants of the choice of a destination market for cross-listing and home bias 
separately, we are not aware of any study that has directly tested the relationship between cross-
listing activity and the home bias. In this paper, we intend to fill this gap. 
We argue that cross-listing decision and, in particular, the choice of the host market for cross-
listing is affected by preferences of home and host market investors. A relationship between 
cross-listing decision and the home bias of investors can be expected for several possible 
reasons. On one hand, managers may anticipate the home bias of investors and make their cross-
listing decisions in accordance with investors’ preferences. For example, companies would be 
less likely to cross-list in a foreign market where investors exhibit strong home bias, i.e. tend to 
heavily overinvest in domestic equities, in order to avoid failure to widen investor base after 
cross-listing. Alternatively, managers may exhibit behavioral biases similar to those of investors. 
For example, numerous studies have shown a familiarity bias in the investment decisions of 
individual and institutional investors (see Grinblatt and Kelopharju, 2001; Chan et al, 2005, 
among others). This also would lead to cross-listing behavior reflecting the cross-border 
investments distribution. On the other hand, managers may cross-list to make the company’s 
shares available to investors who otherwise would be reluctant to invest overseas due to their 
preferences for the domestic market’s shares. In this case, cross-listing is a means to overcome 
the home bias of investors. Such behaviour would be in line with the habitat formation argument 
of Barberis et al. (2005) 
In this paper, we test whether cross-listing decision is affected by the home bias of investors of 
the home and host markets. We obtain data on a sample of cross-listings from 45 home markets 
to 32 host markets from Sarkissian and Schill (2012) and obtain data on the domestic and foreign 
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equity holdings of investors from Chan et al. (2005) and, additionally, foreign equity allocation 
data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). We use the equity 
investment allocation data to calculate two measures of foreign bias used in the literature,3 the 
domestic bias and the foreign bias. The domestic bias, which is the degree of overinvestment in 
the home market, measures preference for investing in the home market. The foreign bias, which 
is the degree of over-/under- investment in a foreign market, measures preference for investing in 
foreign equities of a particular country. Our analysis shows that there is a strong relationship 
between cross-listing activity and the domestic and foreign bias of both home and host market 
investors, even after controlling for a range of other variables that have been used to explain 
cross-listing activity. Specifically, we observe that cross-listing activity reflects the home bias, 
including the domestic bias and the foreign bias, of both home and host market investors. 
Regarding the domestic bias, firms from countries with higher domestic biases tend to engage in 
less cross-listing activity and firms cross-list less in markets where investors display a higher 
domestic bias. For the foreign bias, we find that firms have a preference for cross-listing in 
markets, where the host market investors have a preference for holding equities from those 
countries, i.e. cross-listings reflect the investment preferences of host market investors. Our 
findings are robust to different measures of home bias and cross-listing activity and different 
estimation procedures. Overall, these results suggest that corporate managers, when making a 
cross-listing decision, may be prone to the same behavioral/familiarity bias as investors. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant 
literature on cross-listing and the home bias and develop the hypothesis on the role of home bias 
                                                          
3 For example see Chan et al. (2005, 2009), Aherne et al. (2004), and Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010). 
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in the cross-listing decision. Section 3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 4 presents 
the findings from our analysis and robustness tests. We conclude in section 5. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Factor affecting the Cross-listing Decision 
Several theories and arguments have been proposed to explain the motivation to cross-list and 
the choice of host market. Traditional arguments for cross-listing are predominantly based on 
barriers (e.g. market segmentation [Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977)] or informational 
barriers [Merton (1987), Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003)], 
preference for better “quality” markets (e.g. improved liquidity [Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; 
Domowitz et al., 1998]; stronger investor protection [Stulz (1999), Coffee (1999), Doidge et al., 
(2004)]; or stricter disclosure regimes [Fuerst (1998), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006), Amira 
and Muzere (2011)]); etc. These arguments all suggest that firms look to cross-list in markets 
that are different from the home market. 
 
More recent studies, however, suggest that firms choose to cross-list in markets where they 
benefit the corporation’s global strategy (e.g. Bancel and Mittoo, 2001), where peers are cross-
listed (Pagano et al., 2002), and where it improves the firm’s image with their global customers 
(King and Mittoo, 2007). These arguments suggest that firms are more likely to cross-list in 
proximate markets, either geographically, economically or culturally. This idea was first 
amalgamated by Sarkissian and Schill (2004) who argue that firms choose to cross-list in 
familiar markets, leading to a so-called proximity preference bias. Specifically, they show that 
geographic, economic, industrial and cultural proximity (variables that have also been shown to 
affect the home bias [e.g. Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Huberman (2001), and Grinblatt and 
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Keloharju (2001)]) affect the choice of market to cross-list in.  Although such a proximity 
preference may be explained through lower informational asymmetries, it can also be the case 
that the proximity preference bias in cross-listing reflects the behavioral biases of investors. In 
the latter case it can be argued that if foreign investors have a strong preference for investing in 
domestic equities, they may have a bias against holding the equity of a foreign company even if 
it cross-lists in their domestic market. This is known as the familiarity bias. 
 
2.2 Behavioral Explanation of the Home Bias 
A phenomenon that seems to have very similar drivers as the cross-listing decision is the home 
bias. The home bias is typically described as the phenomenon that investors prefer to hold 
equities from their domestic market more than optimal, even though diversification benefits 
would be larger when investing more abroad. Traditionally the arguments for the home bias have 
focused on rational explanations for why optimal diversification is not possible. Those 
explanation include for instance hedging considerations (home risks may best be hedged by 
investing in home equity), and the costs of diversification (taxes and other restrictions that may 
be imposed on international investment).4 However, these arguments cannot fully explain the 
extent of the observed home bias.  
 
More recent literature on the home bias has focused on informational asymmetries (Kang and 
Stulz, 1997) and what is often called a familiarity bias (Huberman, 2001). The informational 
asymmetry argument is based on the notion that foreign investors have an informational 
disadvantage when investing abroad. This informational disadvantage can be due to several 
                                                          
4See Lewis (1999) for an overview of these and other rational explanations of the home bias. 
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factors such as differences in language, differences in legal system, or even differences in culture 
(see e.g. Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010). The familiarity bias is more of a behavioral bias, where 
investors prefer not to hold foreign equities simply because they are foreign and are perceived 
more risky (Huberman, 2001). The behavioral explanation of the home bias received support 
from Kilka and Weber (2000) who, through a survey analysis, show that domestic investors 
perceive foreign stocks as more risky than domestic stocks, and feel more competent in judging 
domestic stock than foreign ones.      
 
Several other studies document evidence for a familiarity bias in investment decisions. Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (1999), for example, show, for a sample of Finish investors, a strong preference of 
holding shares in companies that are headquartered in nearby locations, and have a preference of 
investing in companies of which the CEO has the same mother tongue as the investor (note that 
Finland is a bilingual country, with Finnish and Swedish as two official languages). Likewise, 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show a preference of investors holding shares in locally 
headquartered firms.  
 
Apart from individual investors, institutional investors are shown to display a similar preference 
for domestic equity. Chan et al. (2005), Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) and Anderson et al. (2011) 
use the holdings mutual fund managers and document a strong preference for domestic equity. 
What makes these studies interesting is the fact that they not only consider the home bias, or 
what we will refer to as the domestic bias but also consider the foreign bias. These studies show 
that investors not only have a preference for investing domestically (measured by the domestic 
bias), but also have a preference for investing in specific foreign countries (which leads to a 
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foreign bias). This foreign bias has again been linked to informational asymmetry arguments and 
a familiarity bias. Chan et al. (2005) link the foreign bias to shared language of the domestic and 
foreign country, the geographic distance between the two countries and the bilateral trade 
volume between the two countries, and find that these three variables have strong explanatory 
power for the foreign bias. Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) and Anderson et al. (2011) extend the 
work of Chan et al. (2005) and show that cultural aspects of home market investors and 
specifically the cultural difference between people in the domestic and foreign countries are 
strong determinants of the domestic and foreign bias. These latter studies clearly demonstrate 
that familiarity plays an important role in the investment allocation decision and that this is not 
only present in individual investors, but also in institutional investors.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Managers contemplating a cross-listing are likely to be aware of the informational asymmetries 
that exist between investors from their domestic market and those from the foreign market, and 
are also likely to be aware of any familiarity biases of foreign investors.5 Managers are equally 
aware of the costs of cross-listing. If cross-listings fail to generate a marked increase in 
shareholder base, then the positive benefits (improved liquidity, reduced cost of capital, and 
ultimately a valuation premium) are unlikely to materialize. If investors are unwilling to invest in 
a company, the benefits of the cross-listing, such as increased liquidity, will fail to compensate 
for the increased costs from the additional listing. Hence, we expect that the home bias of 
investors will be reflected in the cross-listing decision of corporate managers. This can be at 
several levels, where the cross-listing decision can reflect the domestic bias of home and host 
                                                          
5Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) argue that this proximity bias in selecting a host market is driven by managers’ 
beliefs that investors are less willing to invest in companies that are unfamiliar to them.  
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market investor and reflect the foreign bias of home and host market investors. To examine the 
relationship between the cross-listings decision and the home bias we therefore pose the 
following four hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Cross-listing activity reflects the domestic bias of home market investors.  
The cross-listing activity of firms from a specific country may reflect the domestic bias of home 
market investors. There are several arguments for why this could be the case. First, if domestic 
investors have a strong preference for investing domestically, then there may be less need for 
corporate managers to seek a listing elsewhere, because there is sufficient investor base in the 
home market. This can be seen as a rational reason as to why firms do not choose to cross-list.  
 
It can also be the case that managers are prone to the same behavioral biases as investors (such as 
a familiarity bias), and as such countries where people have a stronger bias against investing 
abroad, may also have management in firms that has a stronger bias against listing abroad. This 
can be due to the fact that a listing abroad means that part of the ownership will go to foreign 
investors, and corporate managers may have a bias against this as it may introduce frictions, etc. 
Some evidence of this argument may be gleaned from Ahern et al. (2012), who show that firms, 
when contemplating a cross-border takeover, prefer to do so in countries that have similar 
cultural values as them, in order to avoid any potential conflict or frictions that may arise from 
cultural differences. Hence if corporate managers themselves have a strong familiarity bias, they 
may prefer not to cross-list.     
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Both arguments suggest a negative relationship between cross-listing activity and the domestic 
bias of home market investors. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cross-listing activity reflects the domestic bias of host market investors.  
Cross-listing activity can also reflect the domestic bias of host market investors, i.e. the decision 
to cross-list in a specific country may be affected by the domestic bias of host market investors. 
This domestic bias of host market investors can affect cross-listing activity in two ways. On the 
one hand, the decision to cross-list in a particular market can be an attempt of corporate 
managers to overcome the domestic bias of host market. If host market investors have a high 
domestic bias (strong preference for investing locally) they would not readily invest in firms 
located in foreign markets. A foreign firm may attempt to overcome this bias by cross-listing in 
the host market, and so become part of the investable universe of the host market investors (this 
is similar to the habitat formation argument put forth by e.g. Barberis et al., 2005). This 
argument would predict a positive relationship between cross-listing activity and the domestic 
bias of foreign investors. 
 
On the other hand, the choice of the destination market for cross-listing may be negatively 
related to the domestic bias of host market investors (the stronger the domestic bias of the host 
market investors, the smaller the number of cross-listings towards the particular host country). 
This would be the case if managers believe that even by listing in the foreign market they will 
not overcome the familiarity bias of the host market investors. As a consequence they may prefer 
not to cross-list in a market where the host market investors have a strong preference for 
domestic equity. This argument is similar to the argument of Sarkissian and Shill (2004) and 
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would predict a negative relationship between cross-listing activity and the domestic bias of 
foreign investors. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Cross-listing activity reflects the foreign bias of home market investors.  
Cross-listing activity can further reflect the foreign bias of home market investors. This would 
mainly be the case if the psychological biases of corporate management reflect the biases of 
home market investors. It would suggest that familiarity bias plays a role not only in investment 
decisions for cross-listing, but that the same familiarity bias also affects the management’s 
decision to cross-list. Based on this argument we could expect a positive relationship between 
cross-listing activity and the foreign bias of home market investors. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Cross-listing activity reflects the foreign bias of host market investors.  
Our final hypothesis considers the relationship between the choice of the destination market for 
cross-listing and the foreign bias of the host market investors. As with the domestic bias for host 
market investors, we can expect either a positive or negative relationship. First, if host market 
investors have a positive bias towards investing in the home market of the cross-listing firm, then 
it may be less necessary for firms to cross-list in that specific host market (as foreign investors 
are coming to the host market). Firms would not prefer to cross-list in these markets as the 
benefits of cross-listing in this market, in terms of extending the investor base, may be lower. 
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However, we could also expect to see the opposite effect if corporate managers see this as an 
opportunity to raise more capital from those investors. If these investors already show a bias 
towards investing in the home market, it may be easier for the firm to raise additional capital 
through cross-listing in the host market. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics  
3.1 Cross-Listing Activity  
We measure cross-listing activity between two countries by the number of companies that cross-
list from a home market into a host market. We obtain these data from Sarkissian and Schill 
(2012). Country level data are based on firm level data on cross-listing activity collected from 
surveys of stock exchanges. The dataset includes only official stock exchange listings (excludes 
OTC, investment funds and off-exchange listings) and incorporates information on listings and 
de-listings of companies on stock exchanges outside of their home markets between 1985 and 
2006.6 In total, these data include 2,803 cross-listings from 45 home markets to 32 host markets.7 
We measure cross-listing activity as the ratio of cross-listings between a pair of home and host 
countries to the total number of domestic companies in the home country: CLij/DCi, where CLij is 
the number of cross-listings from home country i to host j and DCi is the total number of 
domestic companies listed in country i (see also Sarkissian and Schill, 2004).8  
                                                          
6 For more detailed description of the data see Sarkissian and Schill (2012). 
7 From the sample of Sarkissian and Schill (2012) that includes 2,838 cross-listings from 69 home countries in 32 
host markets we exclude home countries that contribute only one or two cross-listings. We also exclude United Arab 
Emirates as a host country due to unavailability of investor protection data for this country. 
8We have also conducted our analysis with an alternative and often used measure of cross-listing activity, which is 
the ratio of cross-listings between a specific pair of home and host countries to the total number of cross-listed 
companies from the home country: CLij/CLi, where CLi is the total number of companies with a listing in any other 
market. Although we do not report the results of this analysis, all results are in line with those presented in the paper. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In Table 1, we report summary statistics on cross-listing activity from a home market and 
towards a host market. From a home market perspective, we report the number of cross-listings 
and the ratio of cross-listings over domestically listed companies. In absolute terms, we observe 
that Canada has the greatest number of cross-listed firms (483). We also observe considerable 
numbers of cross-listings from the US, UK, Australia, India, Japan, Israel and the Netherlands. 
As a percentage of domestic listings Ireland dominates with more cross-listings than domestic 
companies.9 The lowest percentage of cross-listings (1.1%) is from Spain with just 37 cross-
listings and 3,378 domestic firms. This is followed by Hong Kong and Singapore, both with 
about 3% of firms cross-listed. 
From a host market perspective, we observe that the US is the most popular market for cross-
listing (1,189 cross-listings, or 42% of the sample). This is followed by the UK with 299 cross-
listings. We further observe significant cross-listings in Luxembourg, a traditional tax haven 
country, and Germany. As a percentage of the number of host country domestic firms, 
Luxembourg is the most popular destination market with 680.6%, indicating it hosts 
considerably more firms than it has domestic listings (245 cross-listings compared with just 36 
domestic listings). We also observe high percentages in New Zealand, the Netherlands, Belgium 
                                                          
9 This is possible if firms cross-list in more than one host market. In this case, each cross-listing is counted in the 
number of cross-listings.  
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and Switzerland.  Emerging markets in the sample host a very small number of cross-listings, 
less than five firms with the exception of South Africa which hosts 17 cross-listings.10 
A closer look at the distribution of cross-listings in the sample description reveals that there is 
considerable clustering in cross-listings. From a home market perspective, we observe that most 
firms cross-list in a single host market. For instance, Canada, with 483 cross-listings, has 434 of 
these in the US (89.9%). Likewise, Chilean and Israeli cross-listings are predominantly in the 
US. Indian, Irish, Polish and Egyptian firms cross-list primarily in the UK. We observe similar 
patterns for host markets, all firms cross-listing in Ireland are from the UK and 95% of firms 
cross-listing in New Zealand are from Australia. Such strong clustering in the choice of 
destination market suggests the presence of a familiarity bias in the choice of destination market. 
 
3.2 Domestic and Foreign Bias  
Our main data on foreign asset allocation are based on the holdings of mutual fund managers 
from 26 countries investing in a broader sample of 45 countries. The country-level data are based 
on underlying individual fund-level data obtained from Thomson Financial Services for the years 
1999 and 2000.11,12 All types of mutual funds are included in this sample, i.e. closed- and open-
end funds, and equity or balanced funds. However, the allocation of one country into another 
only considers the equity part of the funds. Aggregating at the country level therefore, shows the 
proportion of money allocated by mutual fund managers from country i to the equity market of 
                                                          
10
 We classify the sample countries into developed and emerging countries following Bekaert and Harvey (2000), 
Bekaert et al (2003) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004). 
11 For a more detailed discussion on the data, see Chan et al. (2005). 
12 As a robustness test we use foreign equity allocation data from the IMF’s The Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey (CPIS) in 2001-2006 (see section 4.4.4). Comparing foreign equity allocation data from the alternative data 
sources, it is evident that the distribution of foreign equity allocation does not change significantly over time. 
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country j (wij). This proportion has been used as a measure of home bias (domestic and foreign 
bias) by Chan et al. (2005, 2009), and Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010), among others. 
To examine the relationship between the home bias and cross-listing activity, we consider two 
dimensions of the home bias: the domestic bias (preference for investing in the home market) 
and the foreign bias (when investing in foreign assets, preference for foreign assets from specific 
countries). To compute scores for both biases, we calculate deviations from the optimal portfolio 
as described by the CAPM (see also Chan et al., 2005, 2009; and Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010). 
According to the CAPM, optimal weights are given by the market value of a particular country 
relative to the global market value. The difference between the actual investments in a country 
and the optimal weight reflects the degree of bias towards a particular country. 
 
3.2.1. Domestic bias 
Our first measure reflects the degree of over-/under-investment in the home country. Following 
Chan et al. (2005, 2009) and Ferreira and Miguel (2011), we calculate the extent of the domestic 
bias for country i (DBIASi) as the proportion of actual investments in domestic equities relative 
to the weight of the home market in the global market measured by market capitalization, i.e., 
 
*=
i
ii
i w
w
DBIAS ,      (1) 
 
where wii is the proportion of investments in domestic equities of the home market, and 
∗ is the 
optimal weight of investment allocation according to the CAPM, i.e., 
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MarketCap
w ,      (3) 
 
where MarketCapi is a home market’s market capitalization and ∑ 	
  is the total 
global market capitalization. Based on the evidence that investors tend to overinvest in their 
home market (e.g. Aherne et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2005), we expect that wii > 
∗, and the 
domestic bias score to be greater than 1. 
 
In Table 2, we report summary statistics for the optimal investment in domestic equities (
∗), the 
actual investments in domestic equities (wii), and the domestic bias score (DBIASi) (columns (1), 
(2) and (3), respectively) for the 26 home countries. The optimal proportion of investments 
allocated to domestic equities is the highest for the US, Japan and the UK (46.85%, 11.29% and 
8.13%, respectively), while the actual proportions of investments allocated to domestic equities 
are the highest for Greece, the US and New Zealand (93.46%, 85.66% and 74.93%, 
respectively). All countries exhibit a domestic bias as indicated by the domestic bias score, 
which is greater than unity for all countries. New Zealand exhibits the greatest domestic bias 
(1,070.4), followed by Norway (256.89) and Portugal (240.05), while the US exhibit the lowest 
domestic bias (1.83). 
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3.2.2. Foreign bias 
Our second measure reflects the degree of over- or under-investment from a home country to a 
particular foreign country. Let wij be the weight of mutual fund holdings of home country i in 
host country j, i.e., 
 
∑=
j ij
ij
ij
sInvestment
sInvestment
w ,     (4) 
 
where Investmentsij is the investments of mutual funds from country i in country j and 
ΣjInvestmentsij is the total amount of money allocated from country i to all markets. We compute 
the foreign bias score as the ratio of the actual allocation of country i in country j, adjusted for 
the weight of the home market in the global market measured by market capitalization, relative 
to the optimal portfolio allocation, i.e.,  
 
)-1/(
)-1/(
= **
ij
iiij
ij ww
ww
FBIAS ,       (5) 
 
where wij is the weight of investments from country i in country j, wii is the proportion of 
investments in domestic equities, 
∗ and 
∗ are the optimal weights by market capitalization of 
the home and host markets, respectively. This is a modified variant of the measure used by Chan 
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et al. (2005) and Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010).13 A foreign bias score greater than one indicates 
that the home market investors allocate more to market j than is optimal and vice versa.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In Table 2, we report the average and median foreign bias score of the market i (FBIASij) 
(columns (4) and (5)). From a home market perspective, only three countries, the UK, Denmark 
and Belgium, have average and median foreign bias scores that are greater than one, implying 
overinvesting from these three countries into foreign markets. The US has foreign bias score 
close to one (1.023 mean and 0.975 median) indicating that, on average, the US has no foreign 
bias. Canada and Greece have the lowest foreign bias scores, meaning significant 
underinvestment from these two countries into other foreign markets. Altogether, eight countries 
have average and median foreign bias scores of less than one, indicating systematic 
underinvestment from these markets towards other foreign markets. For the remainder of the 
countries we find mean foreign bias scores greater than one and median foreign bias scores less 
than one. This suggests that the distribution of foreign bias scores is skewed to the right, i.e. 
home market investors tend to underinvest in most of the foreign markets, but overinvest in a 
few foreign markets.14  
                                                          
13We modify their measure by adjusting the weight of the equity holdings of home country i in host country j (wij) 
for the proportion of investments in the home market (wii) to make the foreign bias score independent of the 
domestic bias. Without this correction, a strong domestic bias of a country implies a significant underinvestment in 
other countries, and affects the calculation of the foreign bias (see also Bekaert and Wang, 2009). However, a 
measure without this correction produces similar results (discussed in section 4.4.1).  
14
 For example, Hong Kong investors overinvest considerably in Singapore and Taiwan (7.7% and 6.5% of their 
total investments are allocated to Singapore and Taiwan markets, respectively), but underinvest in European markets 
such as Norway, Belgium, Italy,  Denmark, Germany  (0.1% or less of the total investments). Finland overinvests in 
Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark and Norway and underinvests in North American, South American and Asian 
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Finally, Table 2 reports the average and median foreign bias for 45 host markets (columns (6) 
and (7) respectively). Out of 45 host markets, 23 markets have an average foreign bias of less 
than one, implying underinvestment in these markets by foreign investors. 17 host markets, on 
average, attract more than the optimal share of foreign investments, evidenced by the foreign 
bias ratio that is greater than one. However, only 6 host markets have median foreign bias greater 
than one. This confirms that the degree of under- and overinvestment varies across host markets: 
particular host markets receive significant investments from a handful of particular home 
countries.15 
 
3.3 Correlations between Home Bias and Cross-listing 
Summary statistics on the distribution of cross-listings and foreign investments show that there 
may be some similarities between the choice of the market for cross-listing and the choice of the 
host market for equity allocation. As an initial assessment of this relationship, we compute 
correlations between the measures of home bias, domestic bias and foreign bias scores, and the 
measures of cross-listing activity. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
equity markets. Also, New Zealand overinvests in Australia and Hong Kong and underinvests in European and 
North American and South American equity markets. 
15
 For example, Thailand is heavily overinvested by investors from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Japan, with 
the average foreign bias score to 3.41 while the median score is only 0.54. Hungary is heavily overinvested by 
investors from Hong Kong, Ireland and Austria, with the average foreign bias score to 2.49 while the median score 
is only 0.50. Finally, Luxembourg is heavily overinvested by investors from Finland, Norway, South Africa and 
Spain, with the average foreign bias score to 2.23 while the median score is only 0.33. 
21 
 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of our variables of interest. We find that there are 
significant negative correlations between the extent of cross-listing activity and the domestic bias 
of investors of both home and host market. For the home market domestic bias this suggests that 
the stronger the tendency of a country’s investors to overinvest in domestic equities, the lower 
the percentage of firms from this country that choose to cross-list (and hence cross-listing 
activity reflects the domestic bias of home market investors). For the host market domestic bias, 
this suggests that the higher the domestic bias of host market investors, the fewer firms tend to 
cross-list in these markets (i.e. firms prefer not to cross-list in host countries where investors 
have a strong home bias). When we turn to the foreign bias, we find a significant positive 
correlation for both measures of cross-listing activity. In other words, the higher the weight of 
investments from a particular home country into a particular host country the higher the number 
of firms from this home country choosing to cross-list in this host country. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Model Specification 
While the correlations show a significant relationship between the cross-listing decision and 
home bias of investors, we conduct regression analysis to ensure this relationship is not driven by 
other potential motivations to cross-list. We estimate the following equation:  
 
ijijmmijiij ControlsHBDCCL εγβα +++= )log()/log( 1 ,      (7) 
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where CLij/DCi is the measure of cross-listing activity where CLij is the number of cross-listings 
from home country i to host j and DCi is the total number of domestic companies listed in 
country i; HBij are the measures of home bias of investors defined in Section 3.2. We evaluate 
the relationship between cross-listing activity from country i to country j and the domestic and 
foreign biases of investors from country i as well as host country j. Lastly, Controlsijm are various 
variables that represent other reasons for cross-listing (defined below). Because the dependent 
variable is left-censored, we estimate Equation (7) as a Tobit model.16 
 
4.2 Control Variables 
While we argue that there is a relationship between the cross-listing decision and home bias of 
investors of the home and host countries, the home bias of investors is likely to be correlated 
with other factors that also determine the choice of a market for cross-listing. We therefore 
control for other possible explanations for cross-listing in Equation (7). 
 
4.2.1. Proximity Preference 
A first set of control variables considers the degree of proximity between the home and host 
markets. Proximity has been shown to affect the extent of home bias (Chan et al., 2005; Grinblatt 
and Keloharju, 2001) as well as the extent of cross-listing activity between countries (Sarkissian 
and Schill, 2004). To control for this potential explanation, we include several control variables 
                                                          
16 In many situations there are no cross-listings for a particular home-host pair of countries. In these cases the ratio 
of cross-listings is zero. In that value was set at .0001 and the natural log of that value was used as the dependent 
variable.  
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to examine whether the relationship between cross-listing activity and home bias of investors is 
not merely driven by proximity preferences of corporate managers and investors. 
First, we include a dummy for shared language. Shared language is often used as a measure for 
familiarity (Chan et al., 2005; Sarkissian and Schill, 2004) and has been shown to affect both the 
home bias (e.g. Chan et al., 2005; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) and cross-listing decisions 
(Sarkissian and Schill, 2004). We expect a positive relationship between shared language and 
cross-listing activity. 
Second, we include a dummy for shared law, which is one if both countries have legal systems of 
the same origin.17  This measure captures a shared historical background and also controls for the 
level of investor protection prevalent in countries with particular legal systems (see e.g. La Porta 
et al., 1998). Based on the proximity preference argument (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004), we 
again expect a positive relationship between shared law and the proportion of cross-listing to a 
particular country. 
Third, we include the log of the geographical distance in kilometres between the countries’ main 
financial centres.18 Sarkissian and Schill (2004) show that geographic distance is negatively 
related to the proportion of cross-listing to a particular country. In addition, Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001) find that investors prefer stocks of firms that are headquartered in nearby 
locations, and Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) find that geographic distance has a negative impact 
on foreign asset allocation. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between geographic 
distance and the proportion of cross-listing to a host market.  
                                                          
17 We have also run analysis with a shared common law dummy variable instead of a shared law dummy variable. 
As common law is largely restricted to current and former members of the British Commonwealth, this variable 
captures a shared historical background and also controls for the superior investor protection prevalent in common 
law countries (La Porta et al., 1998). We found no difference in explanatory power of a shared common law variable 
and a shared common law variable. 
18 Geographic distances are the distances between the major financial centres of the countries calculated “as the 
crow flies”. Data source: the distance calculator from http://www.geobytes.com. 
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The next two control variables are economic and industrial proximity measures suggested by 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004). Following Sarkissian and Schill (2004), we measure economic 
proximity by the percentage of home country i’s exports going to host country j in 2006. We 
obtain export data from the United Nations’ International Merchandise Trade Statistics.19  
Industrial proximity measure, proxied by the correlation of industry rankings between each pair 
of countries, is obtained from Sarkissian and Schill (2004). For both variables, we expect a 
positive relationship. 
 
4.2.2. Fundamental factors 
The second group of control variables proxy for the fundamental factors that potentially affect 
cross-listing decision. First, Alexander et al. (1987) and Errunza and Miller (2000) argue that 
firms seek to cross-list to overcome market segmentation. Higher segmentation means markets 
are less likely to move together, and, from an investor’s point of view, offer greater 
diversification benefits. We capture the level of segmentation between markets by using the 
correlation between stock market index returns of host and home countries (see also Chan et al., 
2005; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010), calculated using monthly Datastream Total Market index 
returns over the past five years. The market segmentation hypothesis suggests a negative 
relationship between stock market correlations and cross-listings.  
Second, we control for the differences in the level of mandatory disclosure across markets. 
Cross-listing in a market with more stringent disclosure requirements signals the company’s 
quality to investors (Fuerst, 1998) and reduces information and monitoring costs of investors, 
which, in turn, improves market valuation of the cross-listing company (Chemmanur and 
                                                          
19 Available online http://comtrade.un.org/ 
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Fulghieri, 2006). We calculate the incremental information disclosure associated with cross-
listing using accounting standards data in different countries from Bae, Tan and Welker (2008). 
The information disclosure hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between additional 
disclosure and cross-listings. 
Third, to control for the legal bonding motivation for cross-listing posited by Doidge et al. 
(2004), we include a variable that measures the difference in the quality of the investor 
protection laws. Legal is calculated as the difference in investor protection between the host and 
home markets. We measure the investor protection of the home and host markets using the Anti-
Self Dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008). We expect a positive relationship between the 
difference in legal environment and the extent of cross-listing activity. 
Forth, we control for liquidity motives for cross-listing (see Foerster and Karolyi, 1998) by 
including the log difference in market liquidity between the host and home markets. Market 
liquidity is measured by the market turnover ratio, computed as the value of the Datastream Total 
Market index’s annual trading volume divided by the index’s market capitalization for the period 
2002-2006. More liquid markets are expected to attract more cross-listings and hence we expect 
a positive relationship with cross-listing.  
Finally, more economically and financially developed markets are likely to offer greater benefits 
to cross-listing firms. We control for differences in economic development by employing 
Economic Development, computed as the log difference in GDP per capita in 2006 (measured in 
US$) between the host and home market. Financial Development is computed as the log 
difference in the ratio of total stock market capitalization to GDP between host and home market. 
All values are from 2006, stock market capitalization values come from the World Federation of 
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Exchanges’ statistics, while country GDP is collected from UN statistics division. 20 We expect 
that host countries with higher levels of economic and financial development relative to those of 
the home country attract larger number of foreign listings. 
 
4.2.3. Tax Motives 
Cross-listing activity as well as cross-border investment flows might be motivated by tax 
motives. Some host markets, so called tax-havens, attract foreign investors and foreign firms for 
listing by providing an attractive low-tax environment. Empirically, Sarkissian and Schill (2004) 
show that, firms tend to cross-list more actively in host markets that have a more liberal tax 
environment. We control for these tax-savings motives of cross-listing and, following Sarkissian 
and Schill (2004), include a control variable Tax Haven, a dummy variable that equals one if the 
host market is a tax haven country and zero otherwise. In our sample of host markets, we classify 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Switzerland as tax havens. 
 
4.3 Estimation Results 
4.3.1 Domestic Bias of Investors and Cross-listing Decisions 
We begin our analysis with the evaluation of the relationship between the domestic bias and the 
choice of host market for cross-listing. We examine the domestic bias of both home and host 
market investors. We report the results for the domestic bias of home and host market investors 
estimated using Equation (7) in Table 4.  
 
                                                          
20
Available online at http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics  and http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm 
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for the domestic bias of home market investors (with 
various controls). We find highly significant and negative relationship between the domestic bias 
of home market investors and cross-listing decisions for all the different specifications. These 
relationships are robust to controlling for proximity measures between the home and host 
markets, for fundamental determinants of cross-listing and for tax-savings motivation to cross-
list. The results suggest that the cross-listing decision reflects the domestic bias of home market 
investors, i.e. if home market investors have a strong preference to hold domestic equity, then we 
observe less cross-listing activity from this market. 
 
For the control variables, we find that most have the expected sign and several of them are 
significant. Specifically, shared language, economic and industrial proximity between home and 
host countries are positive determinants of cross-listing activity between the countries. These 
results are in line with the findings of Sarkissian and Schill (2004). In addition, the correlation 
between the home and host stock market returns is a positive and significant determinant of 
cross-listing activity. This is contrary to the predictions of the market segmentation theory of 
cross-listing, but is in line with Sarkissian and Schill (2004). Possibly, higher correlations reflect 
higher levels of similarity between markets. Next, an improvement in the legal environment is a 
positive determinant of cross-listing destination (significant at the 10% level in one of the 
specifications). Lastly, the difference in economic development between the host and home 
markets is a positive determinant of cross-listing, significant at 1% in models (3) and (5). 
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In Panel B of Table 4 we report the results for the domestic bias of host market investors. As 
with the domestic bias for home market investors, we observe a negative and highly significant 
relationship between cross-listing activity and the domestic bias of host market investors. This 
relationship holds in all model specifications. Hence cross-listing activity also reflects the 
domestic bias of host market investors, i.e. if host market investors have a strong preference for 
holding domestic equity, then there will be little cross-listing into these host markets. This 
suggests that corporate managers are not attempting to overcome the domestic bias of host 
market investors, but that they recognize their bias of not wanting to invest in foreign firms. Tax 
consideration is a significant determinant of the choice of a host market for cross-listing; more 
specifically, firms tend to cross-list more frequently in countries with liberal tax environment. 
For the remaining control variables the results are similar as for the regression with the domestic 
bias of home market investors. 
 
Finally, in Panel C of Table 4 we include both the domestic bias of home and host market 
investors. We observe that both variables remain highly significant in this regression showing 
that both the domestic bias of home and host market investors play a role in the cross-listing 
decision. 
 
4.3.2. Foreign Bias and Cross-listing Decision 
We continue our analysis with the evaluation of the relationship between the foreign bias and the 
choice of host market for cross-listing. We examine the foreign bias of home market investors 
and of the host market investors. We report the results for these regressions in Table 5.  
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INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
In Panel A of Table 5, we report the results for the foreign bias of home market investors. We 
find strong empirical support that the extent of cross-listing activity is positively correlated with 
the degree of foreign bias of home market investors. In these models the relationship is robust to 
controlling for proximity measures between the home and host markets, for fundamental 
determinants of cross-listing and for tax-savings motivation to cross-list. This suggests that the 
cross-listing decision not only reflects the domestic bias of home market investors, but also the 
foreign bias of home market investors, i.e. firms prefer to cross-list in those markets where home 
market investors prefer to invest and shun cross-listings in markets where home market investors 
do not invest. According to our argument for hypothesis 3, this could suggest that corporate 
managers may have the same familiarity biases as investors. Results for the control variables are 
mainly consistent with the results for domestic bias, reported in Table 4. Particularly, familiarity 
measures, common language, economic and industrial proximity, equity market returns 
correlations and the difference in economic development are positive and significant (at the 1% 
level) determinants of cross-listing. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 shows the regression results for the foreign bias of host market investors. We 
observe a positive and significant relationship between the cross-listing activity and the foreign 
bias of host market investors, which obtains even after controlling for a range of additional 
variables. Hence cross-listing decisions also reflect the foreign bias of host market investors, and 
the results show that if host market investors have a greater preference for holding equity from 
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the home market, then firms from the home market tend to cross-list more in these host markets. 
Again the results for the control variables remain largely unchanged in this regression. 
 
Finally, we estimate regressions with both the foreign bias of home and host market investors. 
The results show that both measures of foreign bias are significant. This suggests that cross-
listing activity reflects the foreign bias of home and host market investors. 
 
4.3.3. Domestic Bias, Foreign Bias and Cross-listing Decision 
Table 6 reports the results for regressions that include all four measures of home bias: the 
domestic bias of the home market investors, the domestic bias of the host market investors, the 
foreign bias of the home market investors, and the foreign bias of the host market investors.  
We observe that both the domestic bias of the home market investors and the domestic bias of 
the host market investors remain highly significant and negative determinants of cross-listing 
activity from home to host country. This means that, on one hand, corporate managers, similar to 
the home market investors, exhibit home bias in their financing decisions. On the other hand, 
corporate managers, while deciding to cross-list, take into account the fact that investors of the 
host market exhibit home bias and, thus, are reluctant to invest in foreign equities. However, in 
all models the coefficient estimate of the domestic bias of host market investors is greater than 
the coefficient of the domestic bias of home market investors. 
Both the foreign bias of the home market investors and the foreign bias of the host market 
investors variables have a positive coefficient estimate, however, the foreign bias of the home 
market investors is insignificant in regressions that control for proximity between the home and 
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host markets. The foreign bias of the host market investors is significant at the 1% or the 5% 
level in all models. Hence, the foreign bias of host market investors seems to be more important 
for a cross-listing decision than the foreign bias of the home market investors. 
 
4.4. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we assess the robustness of the results presented in Tables 4 to 6. We do this in 
four ways. First, we use alternative measures for the foreign bias and for cross-listing activity. 
Second, we add home and host country-level fixed effects to our model. Third, we use alternative 
data for the foreign bias of investors. Finally, we estimate the model over different sub-samples 
by splitting the sample into developed and emerging markets. 
 
4.4.1. Alternative measure of foreign bias 
Previous studies (Chan et al., 2005; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010) have used the foreign bias 
score calculated as a ratio of the actual allocation of country i in country j to the optimal portfolio 
allocation, without adjusting for the extent of the domestic bias: 
 
*=_
j
ij
ij w
w
UnadjustedFBIAS ,       (8) 
 
where wij is the weight of investments from country i in country j in total investments calculated 
as in Equation (4) and 
∗ is the weight by market capitalization of the host market in the global 
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market capitalization calculated as in Equation (3). As a robustness test we use this unadjusted 
measure of foreign bias and re-estimate Equation (7). 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results for this alternative measure of foreign bias.21  The foreign 
bias of home market investors is positively related to cross-listing activity; however, this 
relationship is insignificant in model (4). On the other hand, the foreign bias of host market 
investors variable has positive and significant (at the 1% or 5% level) coefficient estimate in all 
models. Overall, the results for unadjusted foreign bias confirm our earlier findings. 
 
4.4.2. Alternative measure of cross-listing activity 
 In Panel B of Table 7, we report the estimation results for an alternative measure of cross-listing 
activity, a cross-listing dummy variable D_CLij that equals one if there are any cross-listings 
from home country i to host country j, and zero otherwise. This measure of cross-listing activity 
reflects a probability of cross-listings from home country i to host country j. We observe that 
coefficient estimates’ signs and significance for all four measures of home bias are the same as 
those estimated previously and reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Our results show that the 
relationship between home bias of investors and cross-listing activity is robust to alternative 
measures of cross-listing activity. 
                                                          
21 To conserve space, estimates of control variables are not reported but were consistent with those reported in 
Tables 4-6. 
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4.4.3. Fixed Effects 
As a next robustness test, we include home and host country fixed effects in our model. In Table 
8 we report the results for these regressions (with all control variables included) estimated with 
home and/or host market fixed effects. We observe that after controlling for fixed effects, the 
domestic bias of home and host market investors are still negatively and significantly related 
with the extent of cross-listing activity. The foreign biases of home and host market investors are 
the positive determinants of cross-listing activity, significant in all models. Overall, our earlier 
findings on the role of domestic and foreign biases of home and host market investors for cross-
listing activity between countries are robust to controlling for home and/or host market fixed 
effects. 
 
4.4.4. Alternative Foreign Bias Data  
As an additional robustness test, we obtain alternative foreign equity allocation data from the 
IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) available at the IMF’s web-site.22 These 
surveys report year-end holdings of foreign equity securities for a significant number of 
countries starting from 2001. Since these data focus on holdings of foreign equities and do not 
cover holdings of domestic equities, we can only use the data to estimate the foreign bias of 
investors. Since our sample of cross-listing data are for 2006, we are interested in the foreign 
bias data for 2006, and we also use the average for 2001-2006. We use the IMF’s CPIS data to 
calculate the foreign bias of the home and host investors as in Equation (5) where by the nature 
                                                          
22 http://cpis.imf.org 
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of data wii = 0. Then, we estimate Equation (7) with these alternative measures of the foreign 
bias. Estimation results for the average 2001-2006 foreign bias data23 are reported in Table 9, in 
Panel A for the foreign bias of home market investors, in Panel B for the foreign bias of host 
market investors and in Panel C both the foreign bias of home and host market investors. The 
estimation results confirm that the extent of cross-listing activity is positively and significantly 
related to the degree of the foreign bias of home market investors and also to the degree of the 
foreign bias of host market investors. The foreign bias variables are significant at the 1% level in 
all models. Results for the control variables are mainly consistent with the results for the foreign 
bias reported in Table 5. Overall, this analysis shows that the relationship between the foreign 
bias of the home and host market investors and cross-listing activity is robust. 
 
4.4.5. Sub-sample Analysis: Developed versus Emerging Markets  
Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) report significant differences in the determinants of the foreign 
asset allocation of mutual fund managers from developed markets and from emerging markets. 
Dodd et al. (2013) further document that the determinants of the choice of a host market for 
cross-listing are different for cross-listings from developed home markets and from emerging 
home markets. To control for differences in foreign asset allocation and cross-listing decision 
between developed and emerging markets we estimate Equation (7) for sub-samples of 
developed home markets and emerging home markets individually. We follow Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000), Bekaert et al. (2003) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) to classify countries into 
developed and emerging. Table 10 reports estimation results (with all control variables included). 
                                                          
23 Estimation results for the 2006 foreign bias data are not reported but are very similar. These results are available 
upon request. 
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We observe that the results for the developed markets sub-sample corroborate our findings in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 and show that home bias of both the home market investors and host market 
investors are significant determinants of the extent of cross-listing activity between those 
markets. For the sub-sample of emerging markets, the results hold only for the domestic bias of 
the host market investors but are insignificant for other measures of home bias. The main 
limitation in this analysis is, however, the small number of observations for emerging markets 
(only 94 including 74 left-censored observations). Therefore, there is no conclusive evidence that 
the relationship between cross-listing decision and home bias of investors is different for 
emerging markets vs. developed markets. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between cross-listing activity and home bias. We 
obtain data on a sample of cross-listings from 45 home markets to 32 host markets from 
Sarkissian and Schill (2012). We obtain data on the domestic and the foreign bias from Chan et 
al. (2005) and, additionally, the foreign bias data from the IMF’s The Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS). 
Our analysis shows that there is a strong relationship between cross-listing activity and the 
domestic and foreign bias of both home and host market investors, even after controlling for a 
whole range of other variables that have been used to explain cross-listing activity. Specifically, 
we observe that cross-listing activity reflects the home bias of both home and host market 
investors, where firms from countries with a high domestic bias tend to engage in less cross-
listing activity and firms cross-list less in markets that display a high domestic bias. For the 
foreign bias we find that firms have a preference for cross-listing in markets, where the host 
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market investors have a preference for holding equity from those countries, i.e. cross-listings 
reflect the investment preferences of host market investors. Our findings are robust to different 
measures of home bias and cross-listing activity and different estimation procedures. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that the behavioural biases that may lead to a domestic and foreign 
bias, i.e. the familiarity bias, also affects corporate managers in the cross-listing decision. 
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Table 1. Cross-listing Activity: Sample Description 
 As Home Market for Cross-listing  As Host Market for Cross-listing 
Country CLi CLi/DCi  ∑CLij ∑CLij/DCj 
Argentina 28 0.277  1 0.010 
Australia 163 0.093  59 0.034 
Austria 12 0.125  17 0.177 
Belgium 23 0.168  53 0.387 
Brazil 38 0.110  3 0.009 
Canada 483 0.127  86 0.023 
Chile 26 0.107    
China 37 0.026    
Colombia 5 0.053    
Czech Rep 5 0.192    
Denmark 9 0.047  10 0.053 
Egypt 7 0.012    
Finland 16 0.118  2 0.015 
France 97 0.151  103 0.160 
Germany 93 0.142  183 0.279 
Greece 25 0.087    
Hong Kong 36 0.031  2 0.002 
Hungary 14 0.341    
India 162 0.027    
Indonesia 9 0.026    
Ireland 60 1.017  17 0.288 
Israel 137 0.226  5 0.008 
Italy 36 0.127  23 0.081 
Japan 142 0.050  125 0.044 
Luxembourg 30 0.833  245 6.806 
Malaysia 3 0.003  0 0.000 
Mexico 38 0.288  1 0.008 
Netherlands 120 0.938  71 0.555 
New Zealand 33 0.219  91 0.603 
Norway 21 0.108  21 0.108 
South Korea 56 0.033    
Philippines 8 0.034    
Poland 12 0.047  5 0.020 
Portugal 7 0.149  2 0.043 
Russia 16 0.083    
Singapore 14 0.030  41 0.089 
South Africa 41 0.114  17 0.047 
Spain 37 0.011  5 0.001 
Sweden 45 0.163  30 0.109 
Switzerland 47 0.184  90 0.352 
Taiwan 68 0.099  3 0.004 
Thailand 5 0.010    
Turkey 12 0.038    
UK 239 0.082  299 0.103 
US 288 0.056  1189 0.232 
This table reports summary statistics on cross-listing activity as of December 2006 for each sample country as a 
home market and as a host market. DCi is the total number of domestic listed companies in home country i. CLi is 
the total number of cross-listings from home country i. CLij is the number of cross-listings from the home country i 
to the host country j. 
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Table 2. Home Bias: Summary Statistics 
 As Home Market of Investors As Host Market for Investments 
Country 
Optimal 
weight of 
investments 
in domestic 
equities, 
∗ 
Actual 
weight of 
investments 
in domestic 
equities, wii 
 
Domestic 
Bias 
score, 
DBIASi 
Average 
Foreign 
Bias 
score, 
FBIASij 
Median 
Foreign 
Bias 
score, 
FBIASij 
 
Average 
Foreign 
Bias, 
/
∗ 
Median Foreign Bias, 
/
∗ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Argentina       0.09 0.03 
Australia 1.18% 60.50% 51.27 1.628 0.789  1.17 0.28 
Austria 0.09% 6.77% 75.22 1.042 0.595  0.81 0.33 
Belgium 0.55% 24.73% 44.96 1.343 1.174  0.35 0.21 
Brazil       0.35 0.10 
Canada 2.44% 26.99% 11.06 0.303 0.320  0.14 0.10 
Chile       0.03 0.00 
China       0.09 0.01 
Colombia       0.23 0.00 
Czech Rep       1.80 0.33 
Denmark 0.31% 18.41% 59.39 1.632 1.298  1.07 0.39 
Egypt       0.10 0.00 
Finland 0.95% 45.70% 48.11 2.691 0.431  2.16 1.59 
France 4.32% 55.27% 12.79 0.937 0.563  1.13 1.06 
Germany 3.99% 33.49% 8.39 1.303 0.638  1.06 0.82 
Greece 0.46% 93.46% 203.17 0.494 0.268  0.18 0.11 
Hong Kong 1.82% 26.44% 14.53 2.708 0.281  0.75 0.26 
Hungary       2.49 0.50 
India       0.84 0.20 
Indonesia       1.42 0.15 
Ireland 0.19% 6.14% 32.32 0.955 0.748  1.47 1.08 
Israel       0.23 0.11 
Italy 2.22% 35.37% 15.93 0.955 0.672  0.77 0.57 
Japan 11.29% 71.82% 6.36 0.720 0.313  0.57 0.50 
Luxembourg 0.10% 15.08% 150.80 1.363 0.929  2.23 0.33 
Malaysia       0.93 0.85 
Mexico       0.41 0.23 
Netherlands 1.97% 19.49% 9.89 1.233 0.974  1.31 0.20 
New Zealand 0.07% 74.93% 1070.4 2.400 0.299  0.88 1.11 
Norway 0.19% 48.81% 256.89 2.339 0.421  1.00 0.29 
Philippines       0.71 0.37 
Poland       1.18 0.20 
Portugal 0.19% 45.61% 240.05 1.293 0.438  0.86 0.33 
Russia       0.36 0.58 
Singapore 0.51% 18.25% 35.78 2.243 0.201  1.24 0.06 
South Africa 0.69% 66.58% 96.49 1.483 0.536  0.29 0.54 
South Korea       1.32 0.08 
Spain 1.39% 35.96% 25.87 1.391 0.464  0.90 0.71 
Sweden 1.03% 46.74% 45.38 1.697 0.618  1.45 1.04 
Switzerland 2.21% 21.03% 9.52 0.962 0.883  1.08 1.12 
Taiwan 0.91% 60.88% 66.90 0.827 0.628  0.69 0.14 
Thailand       3.41 0.54 
Turkey       0.29 0.08 
UK 8.13% 43.06% 5.30 1.260 1.152  0.91 0.93 
US 46.85% 85.66% 1.83 1.023 0.975  0.40 0.38 
This table reports summary statistics on our measure of home bias for each sample country as a home market and as 
a host market.  
 
  
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
  log(CLij/DCi) log(DBIASi) log(DBIASj) log(FBIASi) log(FBIASj) 
log(DBIASi) -0.11*** 1.00    
log(DBIASj) -0.34*** -0.04 1.00   
log(FBIASi) 0.29*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 1.00  
log(FBIASj) 0.29*** -0.19*** -0.16*** 0.36*** 1.00 
This table reports correlations between cross-listing activity and home and host measures of the domestic and 
foreign bias. Significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  
Table 4. Regression Analysis: Domestic Bias and Cross-listing Decision (Dependent Variable: log(CLij/DCi) 
 Exp. Panel A: Domestic Bias Home  Panel B: Domestic Bias Host  Panel C: Domestic Bias Home & Host 
 sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
                   
Dom. Bias Home - -0.89*** -0.51*** -0.82*** -0.89*** -0.66***        -0.81*** -0.47*** -0.54*** -0.81*** -0.45*** 
  (-5.08) (-3.47) (-4.24) (-5.06) (-3.94)        (-5.22) (-3.23) (-3.02) (-5.21) (-2.59) 
Dom. Bias Host -       -1.76*** -1.20*** -1.84*** -1.80*** -1.36***  -1.69*** -1.11*** -1.54*** -1.70*** -1.07*** 
        (-9.83) (-6.25) (-10.59) (-9.91) (-7.01)  (-9.43) (-5.22) (-8.52) (-9.42) (-4.71) 
Shared law +  -0.61   -0.25   0.17   0.11   0.07   0.08 
   (-1.50)   (-0.58)   (0.41)   (0.28)   (0.17)   (0.19) 
Shared language +  2.94***   2.45***   3.46***   2.80***   2.52***   2.43*** 
   (6.13)   (5.19)   (6.78)   (5.57)   (5.38)   (5.06) 
Geo distance -  -0.80***   -0.21   -1.09***   -0.63***   -0.71***   -0.40* 
   (-3.74)   (-1.02)   (-6.58)   (-3.67)   (-3.89)   (-1.96) 
Econ prox  +  0.29***   0.26***   0.13***   0.13***   0.14**   0.15** 
   (3.05)   (2.91)   (3.32)   (3.32)   (2.02)   (2.01) 
Industrial prox +  4.56***   3.59***   4.70***   3.99***   3.65***   3.25*** 
   (5.66)   (4.47)   (6.04)   (4.99)   (4.62)   (4.01) 
Correlation -   7.31***  3.66***    5.06***  2.73***    5.56***  2.56*** 
    (8.04)  (3.99)    (6.56)  (4.15)    (6.62)  (2.86) 
Disclosure +   -0.07  0.04    -0.08  0.06    -0.09  0.04 
    (-0.95)  (0.62)    (-1.32)  (1.08)    (-1.24)  (0.61) 
Legal +   1.07***  0.54    0.97***  0.63*    1.08***  0.61 
    (2.64)  (1.55)    (2.61)  (1.85)    (2.66)  (1.64) 
Liquidity +   0.08  0.02    -0.58***  -0.35**    -0.22  -0.15 
    (0.48)  (0.13)    (-3.61)  (-2.49)    (-1.47)  (-1.05) 
Fin development +   0.30  0.25    -0.54**  -0.98***    -0.31  -0.44 
    (1.22)  (0.98)    (-2.34)  (-3.92)    (-1.30)  (-1.56) 
Econ development +   1.76***  1.40***    -0.14  -0.00    0.68*  0.63* 
    (6.12)  (5.05)    (-0.68)  (-0.00)    (1.74)  (1.68) 
Tax haven +    0.57 0.10     1.47** 2.44***     0.35 0.97 
     (0.89) (0.14)     (2.44) (4.00)     (0.57) (1.34) 
Constant  -9.40*** -4.96*** -4.17*** -9.50*** -6.75***  -6.93*** -0.87 -2.27*** -7.08*** -2.38  -2.11*** -0.65 -0.24 -2.15*** -2.40 
  (-14.08) (-2.66) (-6.98) (-14.01) (-3.78)  (-11.15) (-0.49) (-3.42) (-11.03) (-1.31)  (-2.77) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-2.80) (-1.04) 
                   
Observations  833 833 807 833 807  1,100 1,100 1,074 1,100 1,074  625 625 625 625 625 
Left-censored obs.  607 607 582 607 582  828 828 805 828 805  409 409 409 409 409 
Log likelihood  -993.9 -875.2 -897.6 -993.6 -831.0  -1194.4 -1098.0 -1110.1 -1191.1 -1047.4  -837.2 -773.8 -806.4 -837.0 -763.5 
This table reports the results for Equation (7), where we regress cross-listing activity on the domestic bias of home and host market investors and include various control 
variables. We compute robust (White) standard errors and report robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Regression Analysis: Foreign Bias and Cross-listing Decision (Dependent Variable: log(CLij/DCi)) 
 Exp. Panel A: Foreign Bias Home  Panel B: Foreign Bias Host  Panel C: Foreign Bias Home & Host 
 sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
                   
For. Bias Home + 1.31*** 0.71*** 0.77*** 1.31*** 0.59***        0.71*** 0.41** 0.47*** 0.71*** 0.37** 
  (7.73) (4.84) (4.94) (7.70) (4.01)        (3.97) (2.52) (2.73) (3.94) (2.32) 
For. Bias Host +       1.23*** 0.76*** 1.03*** 1.22*** 0.78***  0.86*** 0.51*** 0.69*** 0.86*** 0.57*** 
        (10.14) (6.64) (8.27) (9.96) (6.27)  (4.67) (2.98) (3.45) (4.65) (2.99) 
Shared law +  -0.66   -0.42   -0.40   -0.39   -0.38   -0.34 
   (-1.59)   (-0.97)   (-0.96)   (-0.93)   (-0.91)   (-0.78) 
Shared language +  2.70***   2.33***   3.02***   2.76***   2.18***   2.13*** 
   (5.68)   (4.91)   (6.04)   (5.42)   (4.52)   (4.38) 
Geo distance -  -0.34*   0.14   -0.31*   0.12   -0.01   0.40** 
   (-1.65)   (0.70)   (-1.80)   (0.68)   (-0.04)   (1.99) 
Econ prox  +  0.26***   0.24***   0.22***   0.23***   0.23***   0.23*** 
   (3.12)   (3.04)   (5.06)   (4.88)   (3.24)   (3.23) 
Industrial prox +  5.06***   4.42***   5.50***   5.31***   5.37***   4.77*** 
   (6.69)   (5.64)   (7.11)   (6.62)   (7.19)   (6.07) 
Correlation -   6.34***  3.88***    5.20***  3.28***    5.04***  3.37*** 
    (7.01)  (4.33)    (6.22)  (4.64)    (5.11)  (3.53) 
Disclosure +   -0.09  0.00    0.03  0.15**    -0.05  0.06 
    (-1.37)  (0.04)    (0.47)  (2.41)    (-0.66)  (0.89) 
Legal  +   1.28***  0.77**    0.32  -0.07    0.93**  0.45 
    (3.30)  (2.27)    (0.81)  (-0.20)    (2.13)  (1.19) 
Liquidity  +   -0.08  -0.09    -0.17  -0.14    -0.05  -0.06 
    (-0.50)  (-0.66)    (-1.13)  (-1.04)    (-0.34)  (-0.43) 
Fin  +   0.01  -0.03    -0.19  -0.55**    -0.03  -0.23 
development    (0.03)  (-0.12)    (-0.79)  (-2.20)    (-0.10)  (-0.85) 
Econ  +   1.35***  1.06***    0.32  0.24    1.17***  0.85*** 
development    (4.88)  (4.08)    (1.51)  (1.27)    (3.24)  (2.70) 
Tax haven +    0.16 0.40     0.33 1.61**     0.12 0.88 
     (0.26) (0.58)     (0.54) (2.50)     (0.19) (1.18) 
Constant  -11.13*** -9.85*** -6.97*** -11.16*** -11.40***  -11.64*** -10.80*** -8.65*** -11.71*** -13.21***  -10.11*** -11.88*** -7.45*** -10.13*** -13.80*** 
  (-32.33) (-5.52) (-12.37) (-30.39) (-6.70)  (-34.12) (-7.20) (-14.90) (-32.26) (-8.60)  (-31.03) (-7.27) (-12.64) (-29.33) (-8.35) 
                   
Observations  807 807 807 807 807  1,100 1,100 1,074 1,100 1,074  625 625 625 625 625 
Left-censored 
obs. 
 582 582 582 582 582  858 858 805 858 805  409 409 409 409 409 
Log likelihood  -943.5 -855.4 -891.6 943.4 -827.9  -1184.6 -1097.1 -1135.5 -1184.4 -1057.1  -858.7 -787.6 -835.7 -858.7 -774.2 
This table reports the results for Equation (7), where we regress cross-listing activity on the foreign bias of home and host market investors and include various control 
variables. We compute robust (White) standard errors and report robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Table 6. Domestic Bias, Foreign Bias and Cross-listing Decision 
 Exp. Dependent Variable: log(CLij/DCi) 
 sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Dom. Bias Home - -0.65*** -0.66*** -0.40*** -0.55*** -0.42** 
  (-4.41) (-4.41) (-2.74) (-3.37) (-2.57) 
Dom. Bias Host - -1.57*** -1.58*** -1.07*** -1.49*** -1.02*** 
  (-8.59) (-8.54) (-5.15) (-8.26) (-4.70) 
For. Bias Home + 0.56** 0.56** 0.31 0.42* 0.31 
  (2.40) (2.35) (1.56) (1.88) (1.59) 
For. Bias Host + 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.49** 0.70*** 0.56** 
  (3.24) (3.20) (2.32) (2.58) (2.38) 
Shared law +   -0.08  0.02 
    (-0.19)  (0.06) 
Shared language +   2.34***  2.31*** 
    (5.10)  (4.94) 
Geo distance -   -0.27  0.04 
    (-1.41)  (0.19) 
Econ prox  +   0.13**  0.13** 
    (2.16)  (2.18) 
Industrial prox +   3.73***  3.30*** 
    (4.84)  (4.22) 
Correlation -    3.50*** 2.32*** 
     (4.36) (2.71) 
Disclosure +    -0.03 0.07 
     (-0.48) (1.15) 
Legal  +    1.02*** 0.60* 
     (2.60) (1.66) 
Liquidity  +    -0.22 -0.16 
     (-1.58) (-1.19) 
Fin development +    -0.33 -0.42 
     (-1.43) (-1.57) 
Econ development +    0.89** 0.79** 
     (2.15) (2.14) 
Tax haven +  0.39   0.84 
   (0.64)   (1.19) 
Constant  -2.40*** -2.44*** -4.28** -1.17 -6.11*** 
  (-3.15) (-3.16) (-2.14) (-1.58) (-2.86) 
       
Observations  625 625 625 625 625 
Left-censored obs.  409 409 409 409 409 
Log likelihood  -804.2 -803.9 -763.7 -786.7 -751.9 
This table reports the results for Equation (7), where we regress cross-listing activity on both the domestic and 
foreign bias of home and host market investors and include various control variables. We compute robust (White) 
standard errors and report robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 7. Robustness tests: Alternative measure of Foreign Bias and Alternative Estimation Procedure 
 
 
Dom. Bias 
Home 
Dom. Bias 
Host 
For.Bias 
Home 
For.Bias 
Host  
Observations 
Left-
censored 
obs. 
Log 
likelihood 
Panel A. Tobit Model: Foreign Bias Unadjusted 
Dependent Variable: log(CLij/DCi) 
Model (1) 
  
0.53*** 
  
807 582 -830.6 
   
(3.97) 
     
Model (2) 
   
0.70*** 
 
1,074 805 -1063.6 
    
(5.91) 
    
Model (3) 
  
0.32** 0.48*** 
 
625 409 -778.7 
   
(2.15) (2.64) 
    
Model (4) -0.43** -1.03*** 0.26 0.44** 
 
625 409 -756.6 
 
(-2.53) (-4.61) (1.44) (2.05) 
    
Panel B. Probit model, Dependent Variable: D_CL 
Model (9) -0.29*** 
    
807 
 
-310.9 
 
(-5.91) 
       
Model (10) 
 
-0.29*** 
   
1,099 
 
-437.3 
  
(-5.65) 
      
Model (11) -0.24*** -0.20*** 
   
625 
 
-271.1 
 
(-4.45) (-3.15) 
      
Model (12) 
  
0.10*** 
  
807 
 
-325.6 
   
(2.80) 
     
Model (13) 
   
0.12*** 
 
1,099 
 
-447.2 
    
(4.30) 
    
Model (14) 
  
0.04 0.11** 
 
625 
 
-285.2 
   
(1.00) (2.24) 
    
Model (15) -0.23*** -0.20*** 0.02 0.11* 
 
625 
 
-268.4 
 
(-4.31) (-3.04) (0.33) (1.70) 
 
This table reports the results for Equation (7). In panel A, we report the results for the regression of cross-listing 
activity on an alternative measures for the foreign bias. In Panel B, we construct an alternative measure for cross-
listing activity (a dummy variable equal to one if there are any cross-listings from country i to j, and zero otherwise) 
and estimate a Probit model for all various specifications of the model. In all regressions we include all control 
variables as used in Tables 4, 5, and 6. We compute robust (White) standard errors and report robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. Significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Robustness test: Fixed Effects 
 
 
Dom. 
Bias 
Home 
Dom. 
Bias 
Host 
For.Bias 
Home 
For.Bias 
Host  
Home 
fixed 
effects 
Host 
fixed 
effects 
Obs. 
Left-
censored 
obs. 
Log 
likelihood 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: log(CLij/DCi) 
Model (1) -0.47*** 
     
YES 807 582 -744.4 
 
(-3.14) 
        
Model (2) 
 
-0.98*** 
   
YES 
 
1,074 805 -989.2 
  
(-4.62) 
       
Model (3) 
  
0.56*** 
  
YES 
 
807 582 -792.1 
   
(3.46) 
      
Model (4) 
  
0.54*** 
   
YES 807 582 -740.5 
   
(2.82) 
      
Model (5) 
  
0.52*** 
  
YES YES 807 582 -716.0 
   
(2.60) 
      
Model (6) 
   
0.86*** 
 
YES 
 
1,074 805 -985.0 
    
(4.63) 
     
Model (7) 
   
0.54*** 
  
YES 1,074 805 -942.4 
    
(3.83) 
     
Model (8) 
   
0.74*** 
 
YES YES 1,074 805 -892.9 
    
(3.51) 
     
Model (9) 
  
0.43** 0.65** 
 
YES 
 
625 409 -739.6 
   
(2.50) (2.56) 
     
Model (10) 
  
0.39* 0.39* 
  
YES 625 409 -699.7 
   
(1.92) (1.83) 
     
Model (11) 
  
0.42* 0.49* 
 
YES YES 625 409 -675.0 
   
(1.89) (1.89) 
     
This table reports the regression results for Equation (7), where we control for home and host market fixed effects. 
In all regressions we include all control variables as used in Tables 4, 5, and 6. We compute robust (White) standard 
errors and report robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Robustness test: Foreign Bias data from IMF CPIS 
 Exp. Panel A: Foreign Bias Home  Panel B: Foreign Bias Host  Panel C: Foreign Bias Home & Host 
 sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
                   
For. Bias Home + 1.41*** 1.00*** 1.33*** 1.42*** 1.11***        1.11*** 0.94*** 0.70*** 1.12*** 0.74*** 
  (14.83) (9.96) (11.77) (14.17) (9.35)        (11.94) (9.33) (5.01) (11.62) (5.65) 
For. Bias Host +       0.90*** 0.43*** 1.22*** 0.91*** 0.89***  0.66*** 0.44*** 0.79*** 0.65*** 0.52*** 
        (9.22) (4.76) (10.71) (9.30) (7.46)  (6.91) (4.77) (5.48) (6.87) (3.85) 
Shared law +  -1.07***   -0.93**   -0.69*   -0.75*   -1.22***   -0.98** 
   (-2.64)   (-2.26)   (-1.70)   (-1.87)   (-3.02)   (-2.38) 
Shared language +  2.95***   2.16***   2.79***   2.43***   2.27***   2.16*** 
   (5.74)   (4.17)   (5.42)   (4.76)   (4.30)   (4.12) 
Geo distance -  -0.25   0.35*   -0.59***   0.14   0.24   0.47** 
   (-1.46)   (1.88)   (-3.32)   (0.80)   (1.30)   (2.52) 
Econ prox  +  0.24***   0.24***   0.24***   0.20***   0.22***   0.21*** 
   (4.92)   (4.48)   (4.78)   (4.18)   (4.88)   (4.21) 
Industrial prox +  5.28***   4.64***   5.20***   4.37***   4.96***   4.53*** 
   (7.03)   (6.18)   (6.91)   (5.83)   (6.95)   (6.17) 
Correlation -   4.67***  3.37***    4.88***  3.70***    3.84***  3.02*** 
    (6.32)  (5.45)    (6.82)  (5.83)    (5.17)  (4.80) 
Disclosure +   -0.02  0.06    -0.02  0.04    -0.00  0.06 
    (-0.33)  (1.08)    (-0.31)  (0.71)    (-0.07)  (0.92) 
Legal  +   0.68*  0.27    0.95***  0.54    0.79**  0.37 
    (1.80)  (0.80)    (2.64)  (1.64)    (2.11)  (1.10) 
Liquidity  +   0.25*  0.18    -0.31**  -0.28**    -0.02  -0.01 
    (1.71)  (1.42)    (-2.33)  (-2.20)    (-0.14)  (-0.07) 
Fin development +   0.23  -0.06    -0.11  -0.15    0.04  -0.02 
    (0.93)  (-0.24)    (-0.46)  (-0.60)    (0.14)  (-0.07) 
Econ  +   -0.42**  -0.36*    2.19***  1.64***    1.10***  0.60** 
development    (-2.00)  (-1.88)    (9.50)  (7.45)    (3.32)  (2.02) 
Tax haven +    -0.30 1.21**     1.09* 0.55     -0.17 0.59 
     (-0.51) (2.01)     (1.87) (0.89)     (-0.30) (0.95) 
Constant  -12.32*** -11.42*** -8.70*** -12.26*** -14.20***  -11.90*** -8.65*** -8.48*** -12.08*** -12.03***  -10.84*** -14.14*** -8.79*** -10.81*** -14.67*** 
  (-36.66) (-7.55) (-15.94) (-34.76) (-8.94)  (-33.80) (-5.66) (-16.30) (-32.84) (-8.16)  (-33.10) (-9.27) (-16.45) (-31.68) (-9.50) 
                   
Observations  1,195 1,195 1,174 1,195 1,174  1,143 1,143 1,117 1,143 1,117  1,006 1,006 998 1,006 998 
Left-censored 
obs. 
 918 918 900 918 900  868 868 845 868 845  739 739 733 739 733 
Log likelihood  -1211.6 -1117.1 -1148.1 -1211.4 -1073.3  -1224.0 -1129.6 -1126.4 -1222.4 -1067.6  -1110.6 -1039.2 -1080.5 -1110.6 -1017.6 
This table reports the results for Equation (7), where we regress cross-listing activity on the foreign bias of home and host market investors and include various control 
variables. We compute robust (White) standard errors and report robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 10. Robustness test: Developed home market vs. Emerging home market 
 Dev. market Emerging 
market 
Dev. market Emerging 
market 
Dev. market Emerging 
market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dom. Bias Home -0.39** 2.48   -0.41** 0.45 
 (-2.23) (0.46)   (-2.41) (0.07) 
Dom. Bias Host -1.01*** -1.60***   -1.00*** -1.14* 
 (-4.14) (-3.28)   (-4.23) (-1.93) 
For. Bias Home   0.32* 0.94** 0.29 0.67 
   (1.93) (2.31) (1.40) (1.44) 
For. Bias Host   0.63*** 0.16 0.67** -0.02 
   (3.00) (0.38) (2.49) (-0.03) 
       
Observations 552 73 552 73 552 73 
Left-censored obs. 356 53 356 53 356 53 
Log likelihood -678.2 -65.9 -684.6 -65.9 -665.5 -64.2 
This table reports the regression results for Equation (7), where we split the sample into developed and emerging 
markets. In all regressions we include all control variables as used in Tables 4, 5, and 6. We compute robust (White) 
standard errors and report robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
